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II. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case 
This is an appeal from the denial of post-conviction relief. Relief should be 
granted because Mr. Padilla proved by a preponderance of the evidence that he was 
denied constitutionally effective assistance of counsel when counsel failed to file a 
motion to suppress that would have resulted in the suppression of all the evidence 
against Mr. Padilla. 
B. Procedural and Factual History 
Per the affidavit of Officer Matthew Gonzales, Mr. Padilla's case began in 
this way: 
On 08/07/2009, at approximately 0232 hours, I was traveling 
eastbound in the alley between 5th Avenue East and 6th Avenue East in 
the 400 block. As I was driving I noticed a male walking southbound 
on Ketchum Street. When the male noticed my marked police vehicle 
he started running. I got out of my vehicle and yelled for the male to 
stop running. The male continued running and was jumping fences 
during this time I was yelling for him to stop running. The male, 
identified as Tarango Deforest Padilla, was later caught laying in some 
bushes at the intersection of 5th Avenue East and Blue Lakes 
Boulevard, in the City and County of Twin Falls, State of Idaho. 
Padilla was detained until it could be determined why he had run. In 
a search of the area where the male was lying, I located two financial 
transaction cards and $458.00 dollars. Also laying in the area were 
some small ceramic pieces of a spark plug, which through my training 
and experience as a police officer I identified as a tool used to easily 
break vehicle windows. More ceramic pieces of the spark plug were 
located in Padilla's jacket pocket. I know these items are often used to 
burglarize vehicles. All of the items that were located in the bushes 
were clean and appeared to have just been placed there. A search of 
Padilla's person produced 15 peach colored pills with Watson 3203 
stamped on it. These pills were identified using the Drug Bible as 
Hydrocodone Biturate, which is a schedule III controlled substance. 
The pills were not in a prescription bottle and Padilla did not have a 
prescription for the pills. Two other financial transaction cards were 
also located on Padilla's person. A small red flashlight was located in 
one of the yards that I chased Padilla through. 
Padilla was placed under arrest for possession of a financial 
transaction card, possession of a controlled substance and possession of 
burglary tools and transported to the Twin Falls County Jail. At the 
jail I was informed that Padilla had a warrant out of Twin Falls 
County. I informed Padilla that he was also going to be booked on the 
warrant. Padilla stated that was the reason that he ran in the first 
place. After advising Padilla of his Miranda Warnings I asked Padilla 
how many cars he had gotten into and he stated that he had not 
broken into any cars. I asked him how he came to be in possession of 
financial transaction cards that were not his and he stated that he had 
found them on the ground. Padilla was booked in for possession of 
financial transaction cards, controlled substance, and burglary tools 
and the warrant. 
State's Ex. 1, D 27, Ex. Disc, pp. 71-72. 1 
At trial, Officer Gonzales testified that Officer Schlund, who had arrived to 
assist him in chasing Mr. Padilla, reached Mr. Padilla first and "detained" him 
"with handcuffs." At that point, the police did a quick pat down for weapons. And, 
then, Officer Schlund directed Officer Gonzales to the place where Mr. Padilla had 
been captured. In that place, Officer Gonzales found ceramic pieces from a spark 
plug, some financial transaction cards, and some money. Officer Gonzales then 
searched Mr. Padilla and found more pieces of spark plug, two more financial 
1 Officer Gonzales' testimony at the preliminary hearing was consistent with 
his affidavit. In that testimony, he stated that he was in his police car in an alley 
with his lights off when he saw Mr. Padilla. He watched Mr. Padilla enter the 
alley, turned on his lights, drove toward Mr. Padilla, and Mr. Padilla turned and 
looked and then left the alley and started to run. Officer Gonzales followed Mr. 
Padilla with his car, then got out of the car, ordered Mr. Padilla to stop and then 
chased him on foot. State's Ex. 5, Ex. Disc pp. 94-97. 
2 
transaction cards, and some pills. The cards found on Mr. Padilla bore the name 
Jamie Labrum. Cards found on the ground bore the names of Savannah Davis and 
Thomas Mauch. State's Ex. 15, Ex. Disc pp. 205-206. 
The state charged Mr. Padilla in two separate cases with theft for possession 
of a financial transaction card (Jamie Labrum's card and Thomas Mauch's card). 
State's Ex. 3 and 4, Ex. Disc, pp. 83-90. The State later added a persistent violator 
enhancement. State's Ex. 7 and 8, Ex. Disc, pp. 119-127. 
Defense counsel did not file a motion to suppress all the evidence obtained 
pursuant to the unconstitutional Terry stop, the subsequent unconstitutional 
search, and unconstitutional arrest following the unconstitutional search. R 4 7-48, 
225-226. The State tried the consolidated cases before a jury. Mr. Padilla was 
convicted and sentenced to two concurrent terms of 15 years (7 years fixed followed 
by 8 indeterminate). State's Ex. 11 and 12, Ex. Disc, pp. 167-176. The District 
Court later denied Mr. Padilla's Criminal Rule 35 motion for reduction of sentence. 
State's Ex. 17-19, Ex. Disc, pp. 377-391. 
Mr. Padilla appealed and the Court of Appeals denied relief in an 
unpublished opinion. State v. Padilla, S.Ct. Nos. 38899/38900, filed December 28, 
2012. State's Ex. 22, Ex. Disc, pp. 428-433. 
Mr. Padilla filed a timely petition for post-conviction relief alleging 
ineffective assistance of counsel, including ineffective assistance in failing to file a 
motion to suppress. R 13-21, 191-199. Appointed counsel filed an amended petition 
which also raised the claim of ineffective assistance in failing to file a motion to 
3 
suppress. R 53-58, 232-237. 
At the evidentiary hearing, Mr. Padilla testified that when he was walking 
that morning, a vehicle with its headlights off drove toward him at a rate of speed 
that startled him. Fearing that he was going to be jumped, he ran. EH Tr. p. 38, 
ln. 19-p. 41, ln. 5. Mr. Padilla testified that he believed the stop and the subsequent 
search violated his constitutional rights. EH Tr. p. 42, ln. 13-p. 43, ln. 17. 
The District Court denied relief. R 156-166, 288-298. With regard to the 
claim of ineffective assistance of counsel in failing to file a motion to suppress, the 
Court wrote: "Even assuming that there was no basis for a Terry stop/frisk as 
Padilla suggests, police would have had the right to search him following his arrest 
on the warrant. This doctrine coupled with the inevitable discovery doctrine would 
have resulted in denial of any suppression motion." R 162, 294. 
On appeal, the Court of Appeals held that the District Court erred in 
concluding that the evidence would have been admissible even if the investigatory 
stop was unlawful. Padilla v. State, 158 Idaho 184, 191, 345 P.3d 243, 250 (Ct. App. 
2014). The Court vacated the judgment denying post-conviction relief and 
remanded for factual findings regarding the stop of Mr. Padilla. The Court further 
held that the District Court "may also make conclusions of law including (a) 
whether it would have been objectively reasonable for defense counsel to file a 
motion to suppress, arguing that officers lacked reasonable suspicion under the 
totality of the circumstances, and (b) whether there is a reasonable probability that 
the outcome of the proceedings would have been different had counsel filed a motion 
4 
to suppress. Id. 
The State sought Supreme Court review which was denied. Padilla u. State, 
No. 41772/41773 - Respondent's Petition for Review filed 1/7/15; Remittitur entered 
4/6/15. 
On remand, the District Court did not hold a hearing. R 5. 
The District Court entered the following findings of fact: 
Near 2 A.M. on the date of his arrest Padilla left the home of an 
acquaintance to walk to his home approximately two blocks away. As 
he walked down an alleyway he heard a vehicle come at him at a 'rate 
of speed that startled' him. That vehicle was in fact a police cruiser. 
The police car, operated by Officer Gonzales, did not initially have its 
headlights or overhead lights on. The police officer was 'patrolling' the 
alley way as part of his regular duties. Gonzales observed that Padilla 
was 'shuffling' and doing some 'fumbling around'. Gonzales turned on 
his headlights, but not his overhead lights. He turned his vehicle so 
that Padilla could see that it was a clearly marked police car. Padilla 
'turned and looked' at Gonzales as he was getting out of police car. 
Padilla thought that he was going to 'get jumped' by someone and 
began running. Gonzales shouted at Padilla several times to stop. 
Padilla didn't hear the officer say stop. Rather, he continued running. 
He jumped over a fence and twisted his ankle and fell in some bushes. 
As he lay in the bushes after he fell, he 'tossed everything that [he] 
thought [he] didn't want found on [him] in the bushes.' These items 
included a credit card and pieces of a spark plug. 
Another police officer, Office Schlund, heard Gonzales radio call for 
assistance and located Padilla where he had fallen. He was 
immediately handcuffed. He was patted down for weapons but no 
weapons were found. While Padilla was detained by other officers, 
Gonzales searched the area where Padilla had been. He found a credit 
card belonging to Mr. Mauch, some money, and some ceramic pieces 
from a spark plug. Gonzales knew based upon his training and 
experience that spark plugs can be used to break windows on 
automobiles. All of these found items 'were clean and appeared to 
have just been placed there.' Gonzales then searched Padilla's person 
without a warrant and found two credit cards belonging to Ms. Labrum 
and some more pieces of a spark plug. The three credit cards and the 
5 
spark plug pieces from Padilla's person were admitted as evidence at 
trial. The pieces of the spark plug found on the ground were also 
admitted. After finding these items Gonzales retraced the direction 
that Padilla came from and found a flashlight in the yard that he 
chased Padilla through. This item was also admitted at trial. 
R 130-131 (footnotes omitted). 
The District Court also entered its conclusions of law: 
1. The court would not have granted a motion to suppress because Mr. 
Padilla abandoned the credit cards and pieces of spark plug found near 
him and the abandonment was not the result of illegal police conduct. 
2. The investigative detention was proper based upon Mr. Padilla's 
unprovoked flight. The court acknowledged Mr. Padilla's testimony 
that he did not realize his pursuer was the police and he ran because 
he was afraid of being jumped. However, the court found this 
testimony incredible because Mr. Padilla also testified that once he 
had fallen he decided to toss everything which he did not want found 
upon him. The court concluded that Mr. Padilla's flight was casual 
rather than coincidental, shows a consciousness of guilt, and justifies 
an investigatory detention. 
3. The search of Padilla's person was proper because at the time he 
was searched, there was probable cause to arrest him for either 
burglary or possession of a stolen credit card based upon the discovery 
of the card or cards and spark plug parts on the ground. 
132-136. 
The District Court entered its amended judgment and this appeal timely 
follows. R 138-142. 
III. ISSUE PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
Did the District Court err in denying Mr. Padilla's petition for post-conviction 
relief because trial counsel was ineffective in failing to move to suppress 
unconstitutionally obtained evidence? 
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IV. ARGUMENT 
A. The District Court erred - the evidence against Mr. Padilla was 
obtained in violation of the state and federal constitutions and counsel 
was ineffective in failing to move to suppress 
l. Standard of Review 
In order to prevail in a post-conviction proceeding, the petitioner must 
prove the allegations by a preponderance of the evidence. When 
reviewing a decision denying post-conviction relief after an evidentiary 
hearing, an appellate court will not disturb the lower court's factual 
findings unless they are clearly erroneous. The credibility of the 
witnesses, the weight to be given to their testimony, and the inferences 
to be drawn from the evidence are all matters solely withing the 
province of the district court. We exercise free review of the district 
court's application of the relevant law to the facts. 
Padilla, 158 Idaho at 186, 345 P.3d at 245 (citations omitted). 
2. Law of the Case 
In its opinion remanding this case, the Court of Appeals stated that the law 
to be applied to determine whether Mr. Padilla is entitled to relief on his claim of 
ineffective assistance of counsel is "(a) whether it would have been objectively 
reasonable for defense counsel to file a motion to suppress, arguing that officers 
lacked reasonable suspicion under the totality of the circumstances, and (b) whether 
there is a reasonable probability that the outcome of the proceedings would have 
been different had counsel filed a motion to suppress." Padilla, 158 Idaho at 192, 
345 P.3d at 250. 
The State filed a petition for review and in its brief in support argued that 
this is an incorrect statement of the law -- that the standard is whether it was 
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objectively unreasonable for counsel to fail to file a motion to suppress. 
Respondent's Brief in Support of Petition for Review, filed February 17, 2015, p. 21, 
ftnt. 5. The Supreme Court denied the State's petition. 
Mr. Padilla agrees with the State that the Court of Appeals' statement of the 
law sets a new standard more favorable to petitioners than the Strickland standard. 
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052 (1984). 
The law of the case doctrine states that when "upon an appeal, the Supreme 
Court, in deciding a case presented states in its opinion a principle or rule of law 
necessary to the decision, such pronouncement becomes the law of the case, and 
must be adhered to throughout its subsequent progress, both in the trial court and 
upon subsequent appeal ... " State v. Hawkins, 155 Idaho 69, 72, 305 P.3d 513, 516 
(2013), quoting Stuart v. State, 136 Idaho 490, 495, 36 P.3d 1278, 1283 (2001) 
(Stuart IV), in turn quoting Swanson v. Swanson, 134 Idaho 512, 515, 5 P.3d 973, 
976 (2000). 
The statement of the law in the Court of Appeals' decision was clearly 
necessary to its decision. However, Mr. Padilla recognizes that in Stuart IV, the 
Supreme Court held that language in Stuart v. State, 118 Idaho 932, 935, 801 P.2d 
1283, 1286 (1990) (Stuart III), was not the law of the case because the Supreme 
Court had provided little discussion as to why it used the language it did and 
because the Court could not presume that it had excluded certain exceptions 
allowing admission of illegally obtained attorney-client conversations allowed in 
8 
other states. Likewise in Hawhins, the Supreme Court held that the law of the case 
doctrine would not be applied to language for which there was no legal analysis. 
155 Idaho at 73, 305 P.3d at 517. 
In an abundance of caution, this brief will address application of both the law 
of this case (objectively reasonable to file a motion to suppress) and the Strichland 
standard (objectively unreasonable to fail to file a motion to suppress). 
3. Argument 
The Court of Appeals vacated and remanded this case for findings of fact 
regarding the stop of Mr. Padilla. The Court also advised that the District Court 
could also enter conclusions of law regarding whether it would have been objectively 
reasonable for counsel to file a motion to suppress and whether there was a 
reasonable probability of a different outcome if counsel had filed a motion to 
suppress. The District Court made its findings and concluded that counsel was not 
ineffective in failing to file a motion to suppress because the motion would not have 
been granted. The Court thus denied post-conviction relief. The District Court's 
conclusions of law were incorrect and this Court should now reverse and grant post-
conviction relief. 
The Fourth Amendment as applied to the states by the Fourteenth 
Amendment and Idaho Constitution Art. I, § 17 protect against unreasonable 
searches and seizures. When a seizure occurs without a warrant, the government 
bears the burden of proving facts necessary to establish an exception to the warrant 
requirement. Coolidge v. New Harnpshire, 403 U.S. 443, 455, 91 S.Ct. 2022, 2032 
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~)71); State v. Hunter, 156 Idaho 568, 570, 328 P.3d 548, 550 (Ct. App. 2014). 
An exception to the warrant requirement exists when an officer has a 
reasonable suspicion that a criminal act has occurred or is occurring. Terry v. Ohio, 
392 U.S. 1, 22, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 1880 (1968). The stop "is permissible if it is based 
upon specific articulable facts which justify suspicion that the detained person is, 
has been, or is about to be engaged in criminal activity." Padilla, 158 Idaho at 188, 
345 P.3d at 247. 
As noted by the Court of Appeals in the previous appeal in this case, while 
the United States Supreme Court has addressed a situation involving flight and the 
impact of flight in a reasonable suspicion analysis in Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 
119, 120 S.Ct. 673 (2000), prior to Mr. Padilla's case the Idaho appellate courts had 
not applied the analysis in a published decision. Padilla, 158 Idaho at 190, 345 
P.3d at 249. As a matter of first impression in Padilla, the Court of Appeals set out 
the Wardlow holding which declined to adopt per se rules regarding flight, but 
retained the totality of the circumstances analysis. The Court of Appeals further 
noted that post-Wardlow, courts have considered how flight factors into reasonable 
suspicion and developed competing rationales to hold that flight alone is sufficient 
or insufficient to give rise to reasonable suspicion. 158 Idaho at 188-89, 345 P.3d at 
248-49. The Court of Appeals cited State v. Kreps, 650 N. W.2d 636 (Iowa 2002), 
with approval. Kreps held that "the key is that the relationship between the police 
presence and the suspect's flight was causal rather than coincidental." Kreps, 650 
10 
N.W.2d at 644 (citing Smith u. United States, 558 A.2d 312, 316 (D.C. 1989)). 
Padilla, supra. 
The Court of Appeals also noted that whether reasonable suspicion exists 
must be determined in light of the totality of the circumstances confronting the 
officer at the time the decision to stop is made. Id., citing United States u. Aruizu, 
534 U.S. 266, 272, 122 S.Ct. 744, 750 (2002); Lewis u. State, 504 S.E.2d 732, 734 
(Ga. App. 1998) ("'[t]he question of whether reasonable suspicion exists to stop a 
vehicle must be measured by current knowledge' that is, at the moment the stop is 
made and not in hindsight"). 
Kreps sets out a concise protocol for weighing flight in the totality of the 
circumstances analysis: 
For flight to constitute grounds for suspicion, the circumstances 
surrounding the suspect's efforts to avoid the police must be such as to 
allow a rational conclusion that flight indicated a consciousness of 
guilt. Such a conclusion can only be drawn if there is evidence 
permitting a reasonable inference that (1) the suspect knew the police 
were present and (2) the police believed that the suspect was aware of 
the police presence. 
650 N.W.2d at 644 (citations omitted). 
Kreps went on to note that a suspect's actions and statements after he/she is 
seized indicating an intent to avoid the police "plainly cannot serve as one of the 
circumstantial facts from which the presence of reasonable suspicion is to be 
determined." Id., quoting United States u. Jones, 619 F.2d 494, 498 (5th Cir. 1980). 
What is relevant is what the officer knew at the time of the seizure, not what he/she 
11 
learned after the fact. Id. 
Applying the Wardlow and Kreps analysis to this case, the conclusion must 
be that the police violated the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments and Art. I, § 13 
in seizing Mr. Padilla. To use flight as a ground for suspicion to support the 
seizure, the State had the burden to show that (1) Mr. Padilla knew the police were 
present; and (2) that the police believed that he was aware of their presence. Yet, 
the District Court's findings of fact do not support a conclusion that the state met 
its burden. 
The District Court found: 
1) The events happened at 2:00 a.m., two blocks from Mr. Padilla's home; 
2) Officer Gonzales did not activate his overhead lights; 
3) Officer Gonzales turned his vehicle so that Mr. Padilla "could see" that it 
was a marked car; 
4) Mr. Padilla turned and looked at Officer Gonzales as he exited the car; 
5) Mr. Padilla thought he was going to "get jumped" by someone and so he 
ran; 
6) Mr. Padilla did not hear Officer Gonzales tell him to stop; 
7) Mr. Padilla jumped over a fence and twisted his ankle and fell in some 
bushes; 
8) As he lay in the bushes, Mr. Padilla tossed some items in the bushes; 
9) Officer Schlund found Mr. Padilla and immediately handcuffed him; 
10) Mr. Padilla was patted down for weapons, but none were found; 
12 
11) Officer Gonzales searched the area and found a credit card, some money, 
some ceramic pieces from a spark plug; 
12) Officer Gonzales then searched Mr. Padilla without a warrant and found 
two credit cards belonging to Ms. Labrum and more pieces of spark plug; 
13) Officer Gonzales later found a flashlight in a yard Mr. Padilla had passed 
through. 
R 130-31. 
These findings of fact do not support a conclusion that Mr. Padilla knew the 
police were present or that the police believed that Mr. Padilla was aware of their 
presence. 
A finding that Mr. Padilla "could have" seen the police car is not the same as 
a finding that he did see the car and recognized it as such. This is especially true in 
this case which happened in a dark alley at night. There was no evidence that the 
police cruiser was positioned under a light so that it could be identified. And, 
further, a finding that Mr. Padilla turned and looked at Officer Gonzales is not the 
same as a finding that Mr. Padilla recognized Officer Gonzales as a police officer. 
Again, there is no finding that the light was sufficient to make such an 
identification. Moreover, the Court did find that Mr. Padilla did not hear Officer 
Gonzales tell him to stop. And, the Court found that Mr. Padilla believed that he 
was going to be jumped by someone. 2 
2 In its conclusions of law, the District Court used Mr. Padilla's statements 
post-arrest to conclude that he did know that the police were chasing him. R 133-34. 
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Mr. Padilla's flight cannot be considered as a factor supporting a reasonable 
suspicion in this case because the District Court did not find that Mr. Padilla knew 
that he was being pursued by the police. Likewise, the Court did not find that 
Officer Gonzales believed that Mr. Padilla knew that he was a police officer. Kreps, 
supra. 
Absent the flight, all that supports a reasonable suspicion is Mr. Padilla's 
presence in his own neighborhood at 2:00 a.m. and his "shuffling" and "fumbling." 
Mr. Padilla has searched the record and cannot find any statement anywhere from 
Officer Gonzales that Mr. Padilla was "shuffling." But, even assuming Mr. Padilla 
was shuffling, whatever that means, and fumbling in his own neighborhood in the 
night, that is not indicative of a reasonable articulable suspicion of criminal 
activity. And, certainly, "fumbling" without "shuffling" in one's own neighborhood, 
even at night, is not indicative of criminal activity. See, LaFave 104 Search & 
Seizure § 9.5(e)(5th ed.) ("[F]or suspicion of burglary of residential premises, 
something more than presence in immediate proximity to those premises will 
ordinarily be required, for persons have occasion to enter and exit their residence at 
all hours.") 
In reviewing this case, this Court should also be aware that the District 
However, as noted in Kreps, supra, and Jones, supra, a suspect's actions after the 
fact "plainly cannot serve as one of the circumstantial facts from which the 
presence of reasonable suspicion is to be determined." What is relevant is what the 
officer knew at the time of the seizure, not what he/she learned after the fact. 
14 
Court, in its conclusions of law, noted that "The officers in this case had no 
knowledge of any specific criminal activity the area, such as car burglaries or thefts. 
Gonzales only observed that Padilla fled upon his approach. Thus the issue here is 
whether that flight would justify an investigatory stop." R 133. The District 
Court's conclusion that flight alone is sufficient to support the stop narrows the 
right to privacy as recognized by Wardlow. In Wardlow, the Supreme Court 
rejected Illinois' request for "a bright-line rule authorizing the temporary detention 
of anyone who flees at the mere sight of a police officer." Wardlow, 528 U.S. at 127, 
120 S.Ct. at 677, as quoted in Padilla, 158 Idaho at 189, 345 P.3d at 248. 
This Court also indicated its intent to reject an expansion of Wardlow under 
a federal constitutional analysis to establish flight alone as sufficient to allow an 
investigatory stop. 158 Idaho at 189-191, 345 P.3d at 248-250. However, even if 
this Court was to now backtrack and find that Wardlow can be so expanded under 
the Fourth Amendment, this Court should hold that the Idaho Constitution is more 
protective of individual privacy rights and reject the standard that flight alone is 
sufficient to allow an investigatory stop under the state constitution. 
Article I, § 17 of the Idaho Constitution may be and has been read 
independently from the Fourth Amendment. State v. Guzman, 122 Idaho 981, 988, 
842 P.2d 660, 668 (1992). In fact, Idaho's constitution provides greater protection to 
individual privacy than does the Fourth Amendment. State v. Thompson, 114 Idaho 
7 46, 760 P.2d 1162 (1988); State v. Webb, 130 Idaho 462, 943 P.2d 52 (1997); 
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Guzman, supra. 
In Webb, a broader definition of curtilage than that applied under the Fourth 
Amendment was adopted under the state constitution because of differences in 
custom and terrain unique to Idaho and Idahoans greater reasonable expectations 
of privacy. 130 Idaho at 466-67, 943 P.2d at 56-57. In Guzman, the federal good 
faith exception to the warrant requirement was rejected because in Idaho the 
exclusionary rule is a constitutionally mandated remedy for illegal searches and 
seizures which goes not only to deter police misconduct but also to prevent the 
courts from making an independent constitutional violation in using the tainted 
evidence thus impinging on the integrity of the courts. 122 Idaho at 992, 842 P.2d 
at 671. And, in Thompson, the Supreme Court concluded that even if there is not a 
federally recognized legitimate expectation of privacy in telephone numbers dialed, 
in Idaho there is a legitimate expectation of privacy. 114 Idaho at 749-50, 760 P.2d 
at 1165-66. "[Article] 1, § 17 will stand as a bulwark against the intrusions of pen 
registers into our daily life in Idaho." 114 Idaho at 751, 760 P.2d 1167. 
While it may be that under the federal constitution flight without more will 
eventually be held by the United States Supreme Court to be cause for an 
investigatory stop, Idahoans have greater privacy expectations and protections. 
Idahoans expect to be able to walk on the public streets and alleyways without 
having to speak to police if they do not wish to - even if that means walking or even 
running away. Flight alone should not be a sufficient cause for an investigatory 
stop under the state constitution. 
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Given the District Court's findings of fact, the conclusion that the 
mvestigatory stop was appropriate was incorrect. In fact, the investigatory stop of 
Mr. Padilla was unconstitutional and all evidence obtained as a result would have 
been subject to suppression. 
The District Court further concluded that the card, spark plug pieces, and 
flashlight would have been nonetheless admissible because Mr. Padilla abandoned 
them. This conclusion is likewise incorrect. 
The District Court found that Mr. Padilla jumped over a fence, twisted his 
ankle and fell in some bushes. As he lay in the bushes, he tossed away the card, 
spark plug pieces, and flashlight. R 130. 
California u. Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621, 111 S.Ct. 1547 (1991), holds that a 
seizure does not occur until the citizen either submits to the officer's show of 
authority or there is an application of physical force. 111 S.Ct. at 1550-52. Items 
discarded prior to the seizure are abandoned and not protected by the Fourth 
Amendment. Id. See also, State u. Zuniga, 143 Idaho 431, 146 P.3d 697 (Ct. App. 
2006). However, items discarded as the result of illegal police conduct are not 
voluntarily abandoned and are fruit of the poisonous tree. State u. Harwood, 133 
Idaho 50, 52, 981 P.2d 1160, 1162 (Ct. App. 1999), citing United States u. Roman, 
849 F.2d 920, 923 (5 th Cir. 1988); United States v. Tolbert, 692 F.2d 1041, 1045 (6th 
Cir. 1982). 
In this case, the District Court found that Mr. Padilla fell into the bushes. It 
did not find that he was continuing to attempt to evade after the fall by hiding or 
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continuing to run on his twisted ankle. Rather, the Court found that he lay in the 
bushes. This was a submission to Officer Gonzales. The tossing of the items 
occurred after the submission, not before. Therefore, the tossing of the items was 
not a voluntary abandonment and the items were suppressible. Harwood, supra. 
Further, the District Court erred in concluding that the search of Mr. 
Padilla's person after the card and spark plug pieces were found on the ground was 
constitutional because at that point the police had probable cause to arrest for 
burglary or possession of a stolen credit card. R 136. 
The District Court erred in this analysis because the officers would have 
never found the card and spark plug pieces on the ground but for the 
unconstitutional seizure of Mr. Padilla. And, no intervening circumstances 
sufficiently attenuated or cured the earlier misconduct. See State v. Malad, 140 
Idaho 817, 103 P.3d 430 (2004), holding that discovery of an outstanding warrant 
after the seizure of evidence did not dissipate the taint of an officer's illegal entry 
into the defendant's home. Since the police would have never discovered the 
evidence the District Court found provided probable cause for an arrest and search 
incident thereto but for their illegal activity, the evidence obtained in the search of 
Mr. Padilla was subject to suppression. 
Further, even if the evidence in the bushes was admissible in Count II, Count 
I would have been dismissed due to lack of evidence. And, without the evidence 
that Mr. Padilla possessed the Labrum card on his person, the State would not have 
been able to link him to the Mauch card in the bushes. (Mr. Padilla's testimony at 
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the motion to suppress would not have been admissible at trial. Sinunons u. United 
States, 390 U.S. 377, 394, 88 S.Ct. 967, 975 (1968). 
Whether this Court applies the standard that counsel's performance was 
deficient because it would have been objectively reasonable to file a motion to 
suppress or the standard that it would have been objectively unreasonable to fail to 
file a motion to suppress, counsel's actions in failing to file the motion were deficient 
performance. It would have been reasonable to file a motion to suppress because it 
would have been successful and it was unreasonable to fail to file a motion because 
the motion would have been successful - if not in the District Court, then 
eventually on appeal. 
Further, it is reasonably probable that had the motion been filed the outcome 
of the proceedings would have been different. Had the motion been filed, there 
would have been no evidence against Mr. Padilla and he would not have been 
convicted. 
Having proven both deficient performance and prejudice, Mr. Padilla has 
established a violation of his Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment and Article I, § 13 
rights to counsel. Therefore, the order denying post-conviction relief should be 
reversed and relief granted. Specifically, the judgments of conviction should be 
vacated and the case dismissed and Mr. Padilla should be released from custody. 
V. CONCLUSION 
The District Court erred in denying the petition for post-conviction relief. 
This Court should reversed the District Court and grant relief. 
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6 tli Respectfully submitted this~ day of November, 2015. 
Deborah Whipple 
Attorney for Tarango Padilla 
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